Developing and maintaining successful long-term relationship in business-to-business exchanges is highly important as strong and effective B2B relationships are effective for better understanding of business buyers’ needs and requirements and are essential to firms’ financial performance and hence regarded as one of the most important factors to gain competitive advantage. Relationship marketing has received huge attention by researchers both in business-to-business (B2B) and in business-to consumer (B2C) context [8]; has been termed as a ‘new paradigm’ and a ‘cornerstone’ of marketing [18]. Morgan and Hunt (1994) suggested that commitment and trust are the key focal constructs for understanding B2B relationship performance.

The study on B2B relationship suggested that opportunism has important role in building trust which in turn plays key role to develop commitment in a relationship exchange. This study focuses on verifying the role of opportunism as a key determinant for developing trust in the automotive sector of India.

The economy of India is growing and the automotive industry is one of the highest revenue-earning industries in India which contributes 4.4% to India’s GDP and provides direct and indirect employment to more than 13 million people. The automobile industry is the sixth largest in the world and had an annual production of over 20.6 million units in 2012-13. The automotive sector of India is segmented into four broad categories as two wheelers, three wheelers, passenger vehicles and commercial vehicles and category-wise market shares were 77%, 3%, 15% and 4% respectively in 2011-2012. Hero Honda (41%), Bajaj (58%), Maruti Sujuki (46.07%), and Tata (63.94%) are the market leader in the two wheeler, three wheeler, passenger vehicle and commercial vehicle sub-sectors respectively. The automotive sector in India is growing hence multi-national companies like Audi, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Fiat, Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Skoda, Honda, Hyundai, Renault-Nissan, Mitsubishi Motors, and Toyota have already entered in this rapidly growing Indian market. In recent years, the industry has seen an upsurge in its exports to other countries and has emerged as Asia's third largest exporter of passenger cars and total (in 4 categories) export was 2.9 million units in 2012-13 [24,25].

2.0 RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY:

Today’s marketplace is rapidly changing, chaotic, unstable, global and highly competitive [52, 21, 20, 10, 42]. In this 21st century, more and more products and services are becoming increasingly similar and competitive in terms of prices, features and capabilities [34] and hence firms need to develop some competitive advantage in order to be successful in the marketplace. The importance of ongoing relationships between marketing channels is widely recognised [11] and as long-term, committed, trusting, value-creating associations are difficult and costly to imitate hence the importance of buyer-seller relationship as a differentiator is growing now [53].

The study on relationship marketing suggested that opportunism has significant negative impact on trust which in turn develops commitment in an exchange relationship exchange. Many studies have found that the presence of opportunism in a dyadic exchange reduces trust [13, 37, 49, 48, 47, 23, 22]. Though the importance of trust and commitment for the development of long-term relationship is widely recognised in the study of relationship marketing but the empirical evidence about the drivers that affect trust is limited [17].

Opportunism has potential significance in channel relationship in the present marketplace which is highly competitive but opportunism is not properly explained in the study on B2B relationship and hence not understood [23, 6]. The study suggests that most authors acknowledged trust as a critical factor for developing and maintaining long-term relationship directly and indirectly through commitment but used different determinants of trust. Moreover the study on B2B relationship suggested that trust differed by country and industry [46] and on the specific relationship marketing strategy and the exchange context [41] and the significance of inter-organisational relationship varied between companies and markets [3]. A majority of the studies were conducted mainly in the context of the Western market and are very much limited in other parts of the world [46]. The Indian automobile sector is growing rapidly and this would create more local and foreign competition in the future. In the context of Indian market, to the best of my knowledge no study has been made to verify the role of opportunism in developing trust. Hence the purpose this study is to address this gap. Hence the aim of the study is to examine the role of opportunism in developing trust in the Indian automobile industry and the specific objective of the research is as follows:

· To verify that opportunism has impact on building trust in dyadic business relationship.

3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Trust is one immediate precursor and is a critical success factor in inter-organisational relationship. Researchers have recognized several antecedents of trust and opportunism is a key antecedent of trust which in turn develops commitment in a relational exchange [7]. This literature review is structured in order to verify the role of opportunism in developing trust under the following sections with a view to establish the relationship as per the objective of the study.

3.1 Opportunism

Opportunism which imposes a personal, a social, and an economic challenge to relationships is defined as violation of the norms of a specific exchange relationship through behaviours like slip away obligations, using the loopholes of the agreement for taking advantage and capitalizing escape artfully [15]; self-interest seeking with guile [56] and includes such activities as stealing, cheating, breach of contract, dishonesty, distorting data, obfuscating issues, confusing transactions, false threats and promises, cutting corners, cover ups, disguising attributes or preferences, withholding information, deception, and misrepresentation [26, 54, 56 ]. Both in transaction cost economics (TCE) theory and social exchange theory (SET) of relationship marketing, opportunity has been considered as an important factor in B2B exchange context. Firms in a relationship, sometimes take a course of action that is not only self-serving, but also harmful to the partner firm. Such behaviour is called opportunism in B2B relations [22]. Opportunity is defined as "making false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved, threats and promises in the expectation that individual advantage will thereby be realized" [55] and there are four possible forms of opportunism: evasion of obligations, inflexibility or refusal to adapt, violation of explicit or implicit rules, and forced renegotiation aiming to gain concessions [54].

Table 1 highlights the key findings from the literature on opportunism in B2B relationship. Opportunism which plays a key role in the exchange process is not ubiquitous but not unusual [37, 23].

Table- 1: Relevant Key Findings from the Literature Related to Opportunism.

Author	Relationship	Relevant Key Findings
Dahlstrom and Boyle (1994)	Opportunism as an antecedent of buyer intrinsic motivation in buyer-seller exchange.	Motivation is negatively related with opportunism.
Morgan and Hunt (1994)	Opportunism as an antecedent of trust in the KMV model of relationship marketing.	Significant negative relationship between trust and opportunistic behaviour.
Gassenheimer et al. (1996)	Opportunism with satisfaction and performance.	Opportunism has negative relationship with performance and satisfaction.
Smith and Barclay (1997)	Forbearance from opportunism as a trusting behaviour for task performance and mutual satisfaction.	Opportunism is negatively related with trust.
Wathne and Heide (2000)	Opportunism and inter-firm relationship.	Opportunism reduces trust, enhances transfer of RSIs.
Lee et al. (2001)	Opportunism and Guanxi (close business relationship).	Opportunism reduces relational exchanges.
Skarmeas et al. (2002)	Opportunism as an antecedent of commitment for relationship performance.	Opportunism is a barrier to commitment.
Romar (2004)	Opportunism in business relationships.	Opportunism is a critical issue which damages inter-firm relationship.
Skarmeas (2006)	Opportunism with functional conflict and future purchase intentions.	Opportunism is negatively associated with both functional conflict and future purchase intentions.
Ting et al. (2007)	Opportunism-Trust	Opportunism reduces trust.
Hawkins et al. (2008)	Antecedents and consequences of opportunism in buyer–seller relations.	Opportunity is not properly explained in the literature. Opportunism has negative relationship with relationship-oriented performance.
Lado et al. (2008)	Opportunism-Trust	Strong negative relationship exists.
Hawkins et al. (2009)	Opportunism- Dependence	Negative association exists.
Barnes et al. (2010)	Opportunism-Trust	Negative association exists.
Mysen et al. (2011)	Opportunism in business relationship	Seller opportunism is negatively associated with both trust and commitment.

Williamson (1975, p-26) suggested that some humans behave opportunistically either due to their inherent nature or due to their limited awareness or knowledge which he defined as bounded rationality. Individuals behave opportunistically when they find a profitable opportunity [26]. Recent examples include actions from executives at Enron and Arthur Anderson is the evidence of opportunistic behaviour in the real business firms [23]. Macneil (1981) focused on violations of implicit relational norms to define opportunism. The study suggested that If any exchange partner violates explicit or implicit agreements concerning its appropriate or required role behaviour then opportunism occurs [5, 26]. Opportunism can take place under any circumstances like the existence of information asymmetry regarding the party’s attributes [4]. If withholding information doesn’t create any harm to the partner firm and if there is no norm to sharing such information then it will not be treated as opportunistic behaviour where opportunism is defined as the ability to capitalize for one's benefit to the detriment of partners in a relationship [54] and if someone adheres to the letter of an agreement, but not its spirit, may be acting opportunistically and opportunism occurs when an individual or a firm that agrees to one level of performance but delivers a lower level; intentionally misses contractual deadlines; promises a higher quality level than it delivers; or misrepresents its capabilities [43]. Opportunism is defined as aggressive selfishness and disregards the impact of the firm's actions on partner firms [30].

3.2 Trust:

Barney and Hansen (1994; cited by Lado et al., 2003) defined trust as an attribute of an exchange relationship and is a multifaceted concept [35, 4]. The belief of a party in an exchange relationship that the exchange partner’s word or promise is reliable and that partner will fulfil any obligations is known as trust and hence if a party’s promise is reliable and fulfills any obligations in an exchange context than the party is believed to be trustworthy by the exchange partner [4]. The Oxford English Dictionary defines trust as "confidence in or reliance on some quality or attribute of a person or thing. The foundation for research on trust in an exchange context was started during late 80’s and early 90’s [13, 1, 36, 37, 32], but researchers used different concepts and indicators for measuring trust (see: Table 2). Trust is defined as a belief by one partner in a relationship exchange that the other partner will not act against their interests, where this belief is held without undue doubt or suspicion and in the absence of detailed information about the actions of the other partner [28]. Trust is defined as - ‘Expectation that an actor can be relied on to fulfil obligations will behave in a predictable manner, and will act fairly when the possibility for opportunism is present’ [57]; and as the willingness to rely on a partner engaged in exchange in which one has confidence [14]. Our focus here is about specific trust of firms engaged in B2B relationship which results mainly due to reasoning or buyers conscious experience with the supplier and hence generally cognitive in nature [2, 27] and object of trust is the manufacturing/seller organisation [57].

Table-2: Dimensions of Trust

Author	Dimensions of Trust
Zand (1972)	Integrity, benevolence, credibility.
Morgan and Hunt (1994)	Reliability, integrity.
Ganesan (1994)	Benevolence, credibility.
Doney and Canon (1997)	Benevolence, credibility.
Zaheer et al. (1998)	Reliability, predictability, fairness.
Svensson (2005)	Reliability.
Kenning (2002; 2008)	Honesty, integrity, competence, goodwill, constancy.

3.3 Relationship between Opportunism and Trust

The study [19, 37, 54] suggested that the two relationship destroying factors in B2B exchange is conflict and opportunism and perceptions of fairness is related with relationship quality as perceived unfairness damages exchange relationship as it acts as relationship poison [19, 37, 54]. Williamson (1985) suggested that exchange partners are unwilling to behave in a flexible or compromising manner when opportunism exists in that relationship. Because of association of guile with opportunism exchange partners assume that the supplier could try to conceal its action [44].

Table- 3: Relationship between Opportunism and Trust.

Antecedents

Direction

of Relationship with Trust

Source

Opportunism

Negative

Dwyer et al., 1987; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Smith and Barclay, 1997; Skarmeas et al., 2002; Skarmeas, 2006; Ting et al., 2007; Hawkins et al., 2008; Lado et al., 2008; Hawkins et al., 2009; Barnes et al., 2010; Mysen et al., 2011

Lado et al. (2008) suggested that presence of opportunism increases both ex-ante and post-ante type transaction cost. Future purchase intention, which is referred to the extent to which a firm intends to expand its current buying activities with a supplier in the near future [12], is negatively related with opportunism. If a firm acts opportunistically in a way to increase its short-term unilateral gains it not only erodes the long-term revenues potentially accruing to both parties in the channel relationship but results in a transfer of wealth from the relationship [54]. Buyer firm that perceives the seller takes advantage of its exchange partner whenever the opportunity comes is likely to consider seeking alternative supply sources in order to dissolving, rather than expanding, the existing relationship [47]. Opportunism eliminates the required behaviour which promotes adherence to relational norms among exchange partners. Dwyer et al. (1987) suggested opportunism as an explanatory variable to measure trust. The study of opportunism suggested that opportunism has negative relationship with trust, conflict, dependence, cooperation, acquiescence, commitment, satisfaction, motivation, relational exchange and has positive relationship with relationship termination, and uncertainty. Trust is considered to be betrayed if unethical or opportunistic behaviour exists in an exchange relationship [13, 37]. Opportunism creates feelings of betrayal which arises from breaking of norms of reciprocity and fair exchange. This is harmful for building relationships as the engagement of any firm in opportunistic behaviour leads to reduced trust between partner firms. Hence our hypothesis is as follows:

H1: There is a negative relationship between opportunism and trust.

4.0 METHODOLOGY:

To examine the role of opportunism in developing trust, a quantitative research is carried out as the research approach was deductive. This explanatory research, to measure causal relationship between opportunism and trust, is conducted where primary data is gathered by using survey strategy with the help of a self-completion questionnaire which was e-mailed to the domestic dealers of automotive vehicles in the automobile industry of India. Respondents had options to give their feedback by using e-mail or professional SurveyMonkey web link which was also activated simultaneously. Both website and e-mail survey were used as due to lack of prior research in the context of Indian market, it was not very much certain that what approach would be convenient for our respondents. Systematic type probability sampling technique was considered to select the respondents from the sampling frame as population size is large (estimated number of dealers of automotive vehicles is more than 5000); representative sample size was easy to achieve as it was possible to construct a suitable sampling frame along with their e -mail addresses; cheaper and quicker way to do the research and collected data could be statistically analysed by using SPSS to measure basic correlations among the variables as per the research objective.

At present there are 50 manufacturers in the Indian automotive industry, out of which some firms are either newly established or have very low market share [24]. Established manufacturers have their own dealership network throughout India. For this research a sampling frame was constructed by taking both convenience and purposive factors into consideration. Taking market share, long presence in the market and accessibility to their dealership networks due to availability of information into consideration six manufactures have been chosen for their dealers to be surveyed. Samples for this research were drawn from the domestic dealers of those six manufacturers (Bajaj Auto Ltd., Royal Enfield-Eicher Ltd., Hero Honda Motors Ltd., Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., and Swaraj Mazda Ltd.). The manufacturers were selected in a way that the study covers all four market segments of the automotive industry. To receive at least 100 responses to do statistical analysis through SPSS and as likely response rate of e-mail/internet survey is 11% [45] and for inaccurate e-mail addresses, questionnaires were e-mailed to total 979 distributing firms of the mentioned manufacturers. At this point systematic sampling technique was used by selecting every second dealer out of those 2279 (approx) dealers until 979 respondents have been selected. Initial letter followed by several reminders generated 106 responses. Hence the sample size of this study is 106 and the response rate is 10.83%.

Measures of all constructs were developed based on the review of literature. Multi-item measure and seven points Likert-style rating scale anchored by ‘Strongly disagree’ (i.e., value 1) and ‘Strongly agree’ (i.e., value 7) have been chosen to operationalise all variables. A five-item scale has been chosen to capture buyer’s (dealer) perceptions of seller (manufacturer) opportunism during the administration of the exchange relationship. The items were derived from Gundlach et al. (1995) and Skarmeas et al. (2002). Researcher used different dimensions for measuring trust (see: Table 2) but integrity, reliability and benevolence are the three key dimensions whereas other dimensions are somehow related to these three dimensions. Hence these three dimensions each with two items have been chosen to measure buyer trust on seller. The two items for integrity were developed from Morgan and Hunt (1994) and Svensson (2005), items for reliability were developed from Moorman et al. (1992) and Svensson (2005), and items for benevolence were developed from Doney and Canon (1997) and Norman (2002).

5.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS:

Data was analysed by using SPSS to measure basic co-relation among the variables as per the research objective. Descriptive statistics (see: Table 4) pointed out those std. deviations for the 11 scales range from 1.354 to 1.982 indicating a substantial amount of variance in the responses for most of the scales used in this research study. The Skewness values indicated that the scores do not fall in a nice, normally distributed curve where most scales are negatively skewed which indicated that clustering of scores at the high end. Kurtosis values of the most scales are negative. Hence distributions of most scales are flat. Mean values of scales on table 4 suggested that there are average levels of seller opportunism but reasonably high levels of buyer’s trust.

Table-4: Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness		Kurtosis
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error
Altering the fact	106	1	7	4.08	1.672	-.146	.235	-1.051	.465
Exaggerating the features	105	1	7	4.21	1.702	-.382	.236	-1.017	.467
Truthful picture during negotiation	105	1	7	3.10	1.427	.986	.236	-.014	.467
Benefit by detriment	102	1	7	3.72	1.982	-.031	.239	-1.397	.474
Breach of agreement	104	1	7	3.70	1.864	.253	.237	-1.226	.469
Integrity-General	103	1	7	5.27	1.477	-.799	.238	-.171	.472
Integrity-Honesty during problem	102	1	7	4.67	1.720	-.492	.239	-.963	.474
Reliability-Confidence	103	1	7	5.59	1.354	-1.179	.238	.942	.472
Reliability-Dependability	101	1	7	5.20	1.556	-1.036	.240	.301	.476
Benevolence-General	103	1	7	5.20	1.580	-.982	.238	-.037	.472
Benevolence-Focused	101	1	7	4.53	1.677	-.438	.240	-.770	.476
Valid N (listwise)	90

5.1 Checking the Reliability of the Scales:

Table-5: Reliability (Scales on Opportunism)

a Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	102	96.2
	Excluded^a	4	3.8
	Total	106	100.0

List wise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

b b Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.757	5

Table-6: Reliability (Scales on Trust-Integrity)

a Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	102	96.2
	Excluded^a	4	3.8
	Total	106	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

b bbb Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.568	2

Table-7: Reliability (Scales on Trust-Reliability)

a Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	101	95.3
	Excluded^a	5	4.7
	Total	106	100.0

a. List wise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

b Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.769	2

Table-8: Reliability (Scales on Trust-Benevolence)

a Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	101	95.3
	Excluded^a	5	4.7
	Total	106	100.0

a. List wise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

b Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.878	2

For measuring seller opportunism, we used 5 items. In order to check whether all measuring the same construct or not we checked the reliability of the scale. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was used as an indicator of internal consistency. Ideally the value of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient should be greater than 0.7 to be acceptable. Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.757 (see: Table 5b) verified the strong internal consistency in the scales and hence we reported the mean inter-item correlation for the items.

Two items each against three dimensions- integrity, reliability and benevolence were used to measure buyers (dealers) trust on their specific supplier/manufacturer. Though the value of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient should be greater than 0.7 to be acceptable but Pallant (2007, p-95) suggested that the alpha value depends on number of items in the scale and in this case trust-integrity was measured by short scales with 2 items only and hence Cronbach’s alpha of 0.568 (see: Table 6b) is considered to report the mean inter-item correlation for the items. Cronbach’s alpha values of 0.769 (see: Table 7b) and 0.878 (see: Table 8b) for trust-reliability and trust-benevolence respectively verified the strong internal consistency in the respective scales and hence we reported the mean inter-item correlation for the items of these two dimensions as well.

5.2 Computing New Variables

Based on the findings from the above (i.e. checking the reliability of the scales) section new variables are inserted to represent overall measure of opportunism, trust-integrity, trust-reliability, trust-benevolence with the help of transforming variables technique used in SPSS.

Table-9: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Bivariate Correlation.

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Overall Opportunism	102	3.7824	1.23740
Overall Trust-Integrity	102	4.9608	1.33811
Overall Trust-Reliability	101	5.3911	1.31644
Overall Trust-Benevolence	101	4.8861	1.53604
Valid N (listwise)	90

Std. deviations for the measure of all variables- overall opportunism, overall trust-integrity, overall trust-reliability, overall trust-benevolence range from 1.237 to 1.536 (see: Table 9) indicating a substantial amount of variance in the responses for most of the scales used in the bivariate correlation whereas mean values suggested that there exists reasonably high levels of buyer’s overall trust on seller/manufacturers but average level of seller opportunism in the studied dyads.

5.3 Finding the Relationship by Correlation Analysis

Finally the direction of the relationship between the variables as per the hypothesis developed was tested with the help of bivariate correlation method, where the value of Pearson’s r were calculated to assess the strength of the relationship between variables and significance level (sig value) was taken into consideration to measure the level of statistical significance/confidence level. In order to interpret the relationship we followed the guidelines suggested by Cohen (1988, cited by Pallant, 2007, pp-132) as-significance is small if r = 0.10 to 0.29; medium if r = 0.30 to 0.49 and large if r = 0.50 to 1.0.

Table 10 pointed out that the strength of the relationship between overall opportunism and overall trust-integrity is medium (Pearson’s r = - 0.446). The relationship between overall opportunism and overall trust-reliability is large (Pearson’s r = - 0.557) whereas the relationship between overall opportunism and overall trust-benevolence is medium (Pearson’s r = - 0.386). Table 5.1 also pointed out that the relationships of opportunism with all the three dimensions of trust are significant at the p < 0.01 level. Negative values of Pearson’s correlation coefficient indicated the reverse relationship. Hence it might be suggested that the relationship between seller opportunism and buyer’s trust on seller/manufacturer is medium and negatively related.

The study pointed out that there exist opportunism in the automobile industry of India which is in line with the study of Morgan and Hunt (1994) and Hawkins et al. (2008). Moreover the findings of this study that the presence of opportunism in a dyadic exchange relationship reduces trust is also in line with the previous findings (e.g. Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Smith and Barclay, 1997; Wathne and Heide, 2000) but unlike the mentioned studies this study pointed out that the relationship between opportunism and trust is not strong and despite presence of seller opportunism in a buyer (dealer) - seller (manufacturer) exchange relationship buyer’s trust on seller is moderately high which might be due to the fact that opportunism is not uncommon in the automobile industry of India or might be part of culture of that geographical area. Out of three dimensions of trust, reliability is more affected by opportunism.

6.0 CONCLUSIONS, MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH:

6.1 Conclusions:

The primary contribution of this study was to verify the role of opportunism in developing trust in the Indian market. This study was conducted within the context of manufacturer- distributor relationships of Indian automobile industry. This study found that opportunism is negatively related with trust which is in line with the past studies conducted in the context of Western market [37, 49]. However the association is not strong and despite the presence of opportunism moderately high level of trust exists in the dyadic relationship. Hence opportunistic behaviour of the manufacturers/sellers inhibits buyers’/dealers’ trust on the specific manufacturer they are dealing with.

6.2 Managerial Implications:

Though the association of opportunism and trust is not strong and despite presence of opportunism there exists high level of trust but as only local manufacturers are dominating the market now and as economy is emerging in India and hence this emerging economy might attract more local and overseas competitors and opportunism might play strong negative role during the period of intensive competition. Hence the management of the manufacturer firm should be focused on developing higher levels of trust with lower levels of opportunism and this concept should be taken into consideration by the manufacturer firms in order to position them in the market segment and to achieve successful long-term relationship with the buyer firms.

6.3 Further Research:

The findings of this study are based on views of the dealers (respondents) about their relationship with their specific manufacturer and the respondents were selected from dealer networks of six manufacturers of Indian automobile industry and this study might suffer from some respondent bias caused by self selection and or construction of the sampling frame. Hence one limitation of this study is the context of the study. The study is focused on established relationships based on findings from the past studies in the context of the Western markets. Hence findings of this study might not be directly generalised to other institutional environments of India beyond the automotive industry. Data was collected from the distributor’s side of the manufacturer-distributor dyad only which might not be replicated for other side of the dyad [1, 14]. Subsequent research could focus on both sides of the dyad. Moreover, in this study trust is measured just at one certain period of time. Further studies using some longitudinal data might add more value in this context [27]. The relatively small correlations between opportunism and trust are not very surprising, though this finding is not consistent with the previous studies based on Western markets. However as discussed earlier, trust differed by country, industry, specific relationship marketing strategy and the exchange context. At present, there are no studies investigating the role of opportunism in developing relationship for the Indian market. Therefore more research is required in other settings to verify and generalise the findings of this study and to determine other factors if any. In conclusion, this study could lead to further research on B2B relationship in the Indian or any developing economy context.

7.0 REFERENCES:

1. Anderson, J. C. and Narus, J. A. (1990). A Model Of Distributor Firm And Manufacturer Firm Working Partnerships. Journal of Marketing, 54(1), 42.

2. Arnott, D. C. (2007). Trust – current thinking and future research. European Journal of Marketing. 41(9/10), 981-987.

3. Athanassopoulou, P. (2006). Determining Relationship Quality in the Development of Business- to-Business Financial Services. Journal of Business To Business Marketing, 13(1), 87-120.

4. Barnes, B.R., Leonidou, L. C., Siu, N. Y. M. and Leonidou, C.N. (2010). Opportunism as the Inhibiting Trigger for Developing Long-Term-Oriented Western Exporter–Hong Kong Importer Relationships. Journal of International Marketing, 18(2), 35–63.

5. Brown, J. R., Dev, C. S. and Lee, D. J. (2000). Managing marketing channel opportunism: The efficacy of alternative governance mechanisms. Journal of Marketing, 64(2), 51−65.

6. Brown, R., Grzeskowiak, S. and Dev, C. S. (2009). Using influence strategies to reduce marketing channel opportunism: The moderating effect of relational norms. Market Lett, 20, 139-154.

7. Chowdhury, P. P. (2012). Antecedents and Consequences of Trust and Commitment in B2B Relationship: A Review of Literature. Indore Management Journal, 4(2), 49-63.

8. Dall’Olmo Riley, F. and Chernatony, L. D. 2000. The Service brand as Relationship Builder. British Journal of Management, 11. 137-150.

9. Dahlstrom, R. and Boyle, B. A. (1994).Behavioral antecedents to intrinsic motivation in capital equipment exchange relationships. Journal of Applied Business Research, 10 (Spring). 51–63.

10. Day, G.S. and Montgomery, D.B. (1999). Charting New Directions for Marketing. Journal of Marketing,63(Special),3-13.

11. Denize, S. and Young, L. (2007).Concerning trust and information. Industrial Marketing Management, 36, 968–982.

12. Doney, P.M. and Cannon, J.P. (1997). An examination of the nature of trust in buyer-seller Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 61(2), 35.

13. Dwyer, F. R., Schurr, P.H and Oh, S. (1987). Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 51(2), 11.

14. Ganesan, S. (1994). Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer-seller relationships. Journal of Marketing, 58(2), 1.

15. Ganesan, S., Brown, S. P., Mariadoss, B. J. and Hillbun, H. (2010). Buffering and Amplifying Effects of Relationship Commitment in Business-to-Business relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 47 (April), 361-373.

16. Gassenheimer, J.B, Baucus, D.B., and Baucus, M.S. (1996). Cooperative arrangements among entrepreneurs: An analysis of opportunism and communication in franchise structures. Journal of Business Research, 36 (May). 67–79.

17. Gounaris, S. P. (2005). Trust and commitment influences on customer retention: insights from business-to-business services. Journal of Business Research, 58,126–140.

18. Gronroos, C. (1994). From Marketing Mix to Relationship Marketing: Towards a Paradigm Shift in Marketing. Management Decision, 32(2), 4-20.

19. Gundlach, G. T., Achrol, R. S. and Mentzer, J. T. (1995). The Structure of Commitment in Exchange. Journal of Marketing, 59(1), 78.

20. Hamel, G. (1996). Strategy as revolution. Harvard Business Review, 74(1), 69.

21. Hamel, G. and Prahalad, C.K. (1989). Strategic intent. Harvard Business Review, 67(3), 63.

22. Hawkins, T., Knipper, M.G. and Strutton, D. (2009). Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier Relations: New Insights from Quantitative Synthesis. Journal of Marketing Channels, 6(1), 43-75.

23. Hawkins, T.G., Wittmann, C.M. and Beyerlein, M.M. (2008). Antecedents and consequences of opportunism in buyer–supplier relations: Research synthesis and new frontiers. Industrial Marketing Management, 37. 895–909.

24. http://www.siamindia.com (accessed on various occasions during June, 2009 to July, 2014)

25. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automobile_industry_in_India (accessed on various occasions during June, 2009 to July, 2014)

26. John, G. (1984). An empirical investigation of some antecedents of opportunism in a marketing Channel. Journal of Marketing Research, 21(August), 278–289.

27. Kenning, P. (2008). The influence of general trust and specific trust on buying behavior. International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management, 36(6), 461-476.

28. Laaksonen, T., Pajunen, K. and Kulmala, H. I. (2008). Co-evolution of trust and dependence in customer–supplier relationships. Industrial Marketing Management, 37, 910–920.

29. Lado, A. A., Dant, R. A. and Tekleab, A. G. (2008). Trust-Opportunism Paradox, Relationalism, And Performance In Interfirm Relationships: Evidence From The Retail Industry. Strategic Management Journal, 29, 401–423.

30. Lai, C., Pai, D., Yang, C. and Lin, H. (2009). The effects of market orientation on relationship learning and relationship performance in industrial marketing: The dyadic perspectives. Industrial Marketing Management, 38, 166–172.

31. Lee, D. J., Pae, J. H. and Wong, Y. H. (2001). A model of close business relationships in China (Quanxi). European Journal of Marketing. 35(1), 51–69.

32. McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations. The Academy of Management Journal. 38(1), 24–59.

33. Macneil, I. R. (1981). Economic analysis of contractual relations: Its shortfalls and the need for a ‘‘rich classificatory apparatus.’’. Northwestern University Law Review, 75(2), 1018–63.

34. Marken, G.A.A. (1997). What Works in PR? Market Positioning Needs New Look, New Emphasis. Public Relations Quarterly, Fall, 41-42.

35. McEvily, B., Perrone, V. and Zaheer A. (2003). Trust as an organizing principle, organization Science, 14, 91-103.

36. Moorman, C., Zaltman, G. and Deshpande, R. (1992). Relationships Between Providers and Users of Market Research: The Dynamics of Trust Within and Between Organisations. Journal of Marketing Research, 29(3), 314.

37. Morgan, R. M. and Hunt, S.D. (1994). The commitment-trust theory of relationship Marketing. Journal of Marketing, 58(July), 20.

38. Mysen, T., Svensson, G. and Payan, J. M. (2011), The key role of opportunism in business Relationships. Marketing Intelligence and Planning, 29(4), 436 – 449.

39. Norman, P. M. (2002). Protecting knowledge in strategic alliances: Resource and relational Characteristics. Journal of High Technology Management Research, 13(2), 177– 202.

40. Pallant, J. (2007). SPSS Survival Manual: A Step by Step Guide to Data Analysis using SPSS for Windows. 3^rd Ed., Berkshire, UK: McGraw Hill

41. Palmatier, R.W., Dant, R.P., Grewal, D. and Evans, K.R. (2006). Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Relationship Marketing: A Meta-Analysis. Journal of Marketing, 70 (Oct), 136–153.

42. Porter, M. E. (1996). What is strategy?. Harvard Business Review, 74(6), 61.

43. Romar, E.J. (2004). Globalisation, Ethics, and Opportunism: A Confucian View of Business Relationships. Business Ethics Quarterly, 14(4), 663-678.

44. Samaha, S.A., Palmatier, R.W. and Dant, R. P. (2011). Poisoning Relationships: Perceived Unfairness in Channels of Distribution. Journal of Marketing, 75(3, August), 99-117

45. Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2009). Research Methods for Business Students. 5^th ed., Harlow, UK: Prentice Hall. p-364

46. Seppanen, R., Blomqvist, K. and Sundqvist, S. (2007). Measuring inter-organizational trust-a critical review of the empirical research in 1990–2003. Industrial Marketing Management, 36, 249 – 265.

47. Skarmeas, D. (2006). The role of functional conflict in international buyer–seller relationships: Implications for industrial exporters. Industrial Marketing Management, 35, 567.

48. Skarmeas, D., Katsikeas, C.S. and Schlegelmilch, B.B. (2002). Drivers of Commitment and its Impact on Performance in Cross-Cultural Buyer-Seller Relationship: The Importer’s Perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(4), 757.

49. Smith, J. B. and Barclay, D.W. (1997). The Effects of Organizational Differences and Trust on the Effectiveness of Selling Partner Relationship. Journal of Marketing, 61(1),

50. Svensson, G. (2005). Mutual and interactive trust in business dyads: condition and process. European Business Review, 17(5), 411-427.

51. Ting, S., Chen, C. and Darrell E. Bartholomew, D. E. (2007). An integrated study of Entrepreneurs’ opportunism. Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 22(5).322- 35.

52. Trout, J. and Ries, A.L. Positioning Cuts Through Chaos in the Marketplace. In Marketing Classics, Edited by Enis BM, Cox K. and Mokwa. MP. Prentice Hall, NJ. 1995; 8^th ed: pp 234-250.

53. Ulaga, W. and Eggert, A. (2006). Value-Based Differentiation in Business Relationships: Gaining and Sustaining Key Supplier Status. Journal of Marketing, 70 (Jan). 119–136.

54. Wathne, K. H. and Heide, J. B. (2000). Opportunism in interfirm relationships: Forms, outcomes, and solutions. Journal of Marketing, 64(Oct), 36–51.

55. Williamson, O.E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New York, USA: Free Press

56. Williamson, O.E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York, USA: Free Press

57. Zaheer, A., McEvily, B. and Perrone, V. (1998). Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance. Organization Science. 9(2). 141.

58. Zand, D.E. (1972). Trust and managerial problem solving, Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 229-239.

Received on 29.02.2016 Modified on 17.05.2016

Asian J. Management. 2016; 7(3): 185-192.

DOI: 10.5958/2321-5763.2016.00028.7

		Overall Trust-Integrity	Overall Trust-Reliability	Overall Trust-Benevolence
Overall Opportunism	Pearson Correlation	-.446^**	-.557^**	-.386^**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	N	100	99	99